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ABSTRACT
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ultimately rejected the
concept of transformative use having a central role within
the doctrine of fair use. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit
broke with judicial precedent, namely the Supreme Court’s
holding in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., where the
Court unanimously held that the inquiry for the first factor
of fair use is whether, and to what extent, the work is
transformative. The Seventh Circuit’s 2014 decision raises
questions about the scope of the holding in Campbell and
about whether this holding extends to cases outside of the
realm of parody.
This Article will examine the scope of Campbell and
whether there can still be market-centered fair use postCampbell. This Article will then consider the implications
of a market-centered fair use analysis. Finally, this Article
will conclude that courts should continue to utilize the
transformative use inquiry for the purposes of fair use, that
Congress need not intervene in fair use, and that there
cannot be market-centered fair use post-Campbell.
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INTRODUCTION
Fair use, a doctrine of copyright law in the United States, is an
important instrument for the promotion of culture and innovation
in our society. This doctrine is an affirmative defense against
claims of copyright infringement that protects secondary
creativity.1 While fair use has been recognized in common law
since the Statute of Anne of 1709,2 it was not statutorily codified
until the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Copyright Act”).3 The statute
sets out four non-exclusive factors to determine whether a fair use
has been made:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.4
In the years immediately following the enactment of the
Copyright Act, fair use was characterized by uncertainty. 5 Fair use
jurisprudence was wrought with the application of inconsistent
principles and divided courts.6 In the 1980s, the Supreme Court
endorsed the idea that commercial uses are presumptively unfair in
back-to-back fair use opinions.7 In Harper & Row Publishers v.
1

See Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1110 (1990) (stating that the fair use doctrine protects secondary creativity
as a legitimate concern of copyright).
2
See, e.g., Gyles v. Wilcox, (Ch. 1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (recognizing that
“fair abridgement” does not infringe an author’s rights).
3
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
4
Id.
5
See Leval, supra note 1, at 1106 (stating that judges did not share a
consensus on the meaning of fair use).
6
See id. at 1106–07 (“Reversals and divided courts are commonplace.”).
7
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
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Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the fourth
factor is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use.”8 These judicial proclamations made it exceptionally unlikely
that any use that was commercial in nature would qualify as fair
use, and installed the inquiry into market harm as the dominant
paradigm in any fair use analysis.9
Following a law review article by Pierre N. Leval10 and a
Supreme Court decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,11
however, a new strand of fair use jurisprudence arose in the early
1990s. In Campbell, the Supreme Court found that the inquiry for
the first fair use factor focuses on whether, and to what extent, a
work’s new use is transformative.12 The Supreme Court further
elaborated that “the more transformative the new work, the less
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that
may weigh against a finding of fair use.”13 Importantly, the
Supreme Court corrected the Sony dictum that commercial uses are
presumptively unfair.14
Following Campbell, the circuit courts widely adopted the
transformative use inquiry.15 In a recent opinion, Kienitz v. Sconnie
(1984) (“[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright.”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
562 (1985) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
8
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
9
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 715, 722 (2011) (commenting that under the market-centered paradigm
it was very unlikely that any use deemed “commercial” would qualify as fair
use).
10
See Leval, supra note 1, at 1111 (noting that the question of justification
should turn on whether and to what extent the use is transformative).
11
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
12
Id. at 569.
13
Id.
14
See id. at 594 (“It was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that the
commercial nature of 2 Live Crew’s parody of ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ rendered it
presumptively unfair.”).
15
See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We have
applied Campbell in too many non-parody cases to require citation for the
proposition that the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases
involving parody.”).
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Nation,16 however, the Seventh Circuit criticized the Second
Circuit’s use of transformativeness in its Cariou v. Prince
decision,17 rejected the transformative use paradigm, and split from
the majority in its treatment of fair use. In Kienitz, the Seventh
Circuit suggested that the fourth factor was the most important of
those enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 107 and used a market-centered
approach to fair use in its analysis.18 This contrasts with the typical
analysis used by courts when utilizing the transformative use
paradigm, which is driven by the first factor.19
This Article will address the scope of the holding in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., as well as the scope of transformative
use. Furthermore, this Article will seek to provide a detailed
description of the implications that transformative use has had and
explain that the Seventh Circuit broke from an important legal
precedent in its rejection of transformative use. Moreover, this
Article seeks to explain the implications of taking the marketcentered approach that the Seventh Circuit offered most recently in
Kienitz. In light of the Seventh Circuit’s recent holding, this Article
will argue for transformative fair use and assert that there should
no longer be market-centered fair use.
Part I of this Article examines the development of fair use,
beginning with Pierre Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard and its
vast impact on fair use jurisprudence in the last two decades. It will
then move on to the opinion in Campbell and how courts have
applied its holding. More specifically, the section will look at the
application of transformative use to appropriation art by the
Second Circuit in Cariou. Following this, Part I will examine the
Seventh Circuit’s treatment of transformative use in Kienitz.
Part II begins by analyzing the two cases in question in order to
determine what influenced each decision. The section demonstrates
how the two standards can render different outcomes when applied
16

Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
18
Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758.
19
See Jason M. Nolan, The Role of Transformative Use: Revisiting the
Fourth Circuit’s Fair Use Opinions in Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, 16 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 538, 555 (2011) (stating that transformativeness is dispositive of fair
use).
17
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to the same factual scenario. To demonstrate that the application of
each case’s inquiry has different results, this Article applies the
different fair use standards to a hypothetical artist named Ronald
Woratx.
Part III argues that there is still no need for congressional
intervention in 17 U.S.C. § 107. This Article suggests that the
Campbell decision offers a solution to fair use that best promotes
the goals of copyright law, following two decades of more
consistent outcomes and a more widely available defense. Part III
also notes that the market-centered approach taken by the Seventh
Circuit contradicts the goals of copyright law by narrowing the
availability of the fair use defense and in turn stifles the promotion
of both culture and innovation. It explains how the development of
the transformative use paradigm has benefitted fair use immensely
by creating a more uniform standard, which the Seventh Circuit
should have followed. The section concludes that the
transformative use paradigm is a beneficial interpretation of fair
use and that it is a clear standard which reflects the original intent
of both the fair use doctrine and copyright law.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSFORMATIVE FAIR USE
Part A provides an overview of the transformative use
paradigm from an influential law review article to a critical
Supreme Court decision. Part B examines the application of
transformative use by courts after Campbell and the trends of fair
use jurisprudence of the last two decades. Part C directly addresses
the decision in Cariou. Finally, Part D examines the Kienitz
decision and its criticism of Cariou, as well as the transformative
use paradigm.
A. From Leval to Campbell: The Creation of the Transformative
Use Paradigm
Pierre Leval’s 1990 law review article, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, has had a tremendous impact on modern fair use
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jurisprudence.20 Leval published the article following a period of
inconsistency, divided courts, and reversals that marked the fair
use jurisprudence of the 1980s.21 The article was where the term
“transformative use” was first coined.22 In the article, Leval argues
that courts should look to the intention of copyright law,
maintaining that it serves a utilitarian purpose.23 In particular,
Leval suggests that courts should look toward the purpose of fair
use, which is to ensure that copyright protection is not so
expansive to stifle creativity.24 Perhaps most importantly, Leval
reasons that courts should look to “whether, and to what extent, the
challenged use is transformative” in determining whether the first
factor of 17 U.S.C. § 107 merits a finding of fair use.25 Leval
asserts that the soul of fair use is the first factor.26 The article
maintains that transformative use can take a multiplicity of forms
and notably not just parody.27
Leval goes on to argue that transformative use should trickle
into a third factor analysis as well—specifically, that courts should
look to the amount and substantiality of a use in order to determine
whether there was in fact a transformative use.28 Notably, the
article discourages courts from relying too heavily on the fourth
factor, which would severely cripple fair use.29
In 1994, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Campbell that
20

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
(citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1110 (1990)).
21
See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp.
429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417
(1984); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp.
1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S.
539 (1985).
22
See Leval, supra note 1, at 1111 (“I believe the answer to the question of
justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is
transformative.”).
23
Id. at 1118.
24
Id. at 1109.
25
Id. at 1111.
26
Id. at 1116.
27
See generally id.
28
Id. at 1122–03.
29
Id. at 1124–05.

362

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:4

echoed much of the philosophy Leval advocated in his article.30
Campbell has since become arguably the most important Supreme
Court fair use decision.31
Campbell addressed a parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty
Woman” by well-known rap artists 2 Live Crew.32 The Campbell
Court found that a parody may be a fair use pursuant to § 107.33
More importantly, however, the Court found that for the first
factor:
[T]he enquiry focuses on whether the new work
merely supersedes the objects of the original
creation, or whether and to what extent it is
“transformative,” altering the original with new
expression, meaning, or message. The more
transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.34
This seemed to follow the standard set out for transformative use
in Leval’s article.35 This opinion sparked a wave of new fair use
jurisprudence and brought life to transformative use as the
dominant consideration in fair use analysis.36

30

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).
31
See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s
Rescue of Fair Use, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 19 (1994) (expressing
joy that Justice Souter’s opinion guided the fair use doctrine in the right
direction).
32
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571–72.
33
Id. at 579–80.
34
Id. at 569.
35
See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 604 (2008) (“The Campbell
court relied heavily on the concept of transformativeness and on Judge Leval’s
exposition of it in its first factor analysis of 2 Live Crew’s parody.”).
36
Id.
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B. Application of Campbell by the Courts: The New Jurisprudence
of Fair Use and the Development of a More Uniform Standard
Following Campbell, circuit courts began to apply the
transformative use paradigm.37 Over time, the doctrine grew
widespread. For example, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation, the
Ninth Circuit considered whether thumbnails used by a search
engine could be considered a fair use.38 The court reasoned that the
thumbnails did not supersede the original photographs’ use and
that they were transformative because they served a different
purpose from the original photographs.39 This opinion applied the
transformative use inquiry to a case involving search engine
thumbnails—a far cry from parody—and broadened the scope of
Campbell.40
Similarly, in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd.,
the Second Circuit considered whether a chronological assemblage
of reduced-format posters in a biography of the Grateful Dead
titled Illustrated Trip constituted a fair use.41 The court found that
each poster differed from its original expressive purpose due to the
bibliographic nature of the book, and accordingly was
transformative.42 This case broadened Campbell by holding that
even when a secondary user takes an entire work, the use can still
be considered transformative, so long as the use does not supersede
the original.43
In recent years, transformative use has increasingly become a

37

Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We have applied
Campbell in too many non-parody cases to require citation for the proposition
that the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases involving
parody.”).
38
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
39
Id. at 819.
40
See generally id. (applying transformative use to search engine
thumbnails).
41
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir.
2006).
42
Id. at 609.
43
Id.
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more uniform standard amongst the circuit courts.44 For example,
the Second Circuit has cited Ninth Circuit decisions in recent
opinions,45 and consequently outcomes have become more
predictable.46 Circuit courts have interpreted Campbell broadly,
and such opinions have not been limited to parody cases.47 Cases
such as Kelly and Bill Graham demonstrate that a use can be
transformative if the secondary use serves some new purpose, even
when the secondary user did not materially alter the original
work.48 Kelly and Bill Graham are cases about removing images
from their original contexts, shrinking them, and using them in
alternate contexts while still recognizing them as their original
items. Blanch v. Koons is an artistic case about taking images from
a copyrighted work, altering those images, and incorporating those
altered images into a new whole.49 Blanch, like Kelly and Bill
Graham, supports the view that transformative use is fundamental
to determining fair use. Further, Blanch reinforces that
transformative use is primarily about new purposes.50
In Blanch, the Second Circuit found that appropriation art
44

See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 49, 51
(2012) (showing that findings of transformative use can be used to predict likely
outcomes of fair use cases).
45
See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014); see
also Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir. 2015).
46
See Netanel, supra note 9, at 736.
47
See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We have
applied Campbell in too many non-parody cases to require citation for the
proposition that the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases
involving parody.”).
48
See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d
Cir. 2006) (holding that using images of posters and tickets used in a book about
the Grateful Dead was a fair use); see also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a search engine using thumbnail images was a
fair use).
49
See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253 (noting that the defendant’s use of the
copyrighted work involved “changes of its colors, the background against which
it is portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects’ details
. . . as part of a massive painting commissioned for exhibition in a German artgallery space”).
50
See id. at 252 (“The sharply different objectives that Koons had in using,
and Blanch had in creating, ‘Silk Sandals’ confirms the transformative nature of
the use.”).
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could serve a transformative purpose.51 An appropriation artist
named Jeff Koons created a painting entitled “Niagara,” in which
he appropriated a photograph taken by Andrea Blanch.52 Blanch’s
photograph depicted a woman’s lower legs and feet in a pair of
glittery Gucci sandals, decorated with bronze nail polish, which
rested on a man’s lap.53 Koons appropriated only the legs and feet
from the photograph for his painting, excluding the background of
the man’s lap.54 Koons then changed the orientation of the feet
from a 45-degree angle to a vertically inverted position.55 Koons
also added a heel to one of the feet and modified the coloring of
the photograph.56 The photograph was included in the painting
along with three other pairs of feet and lower legs dangled over
images of confections as well as a grassy field and the Niagara
Falls in the background.57
Relying on Campbell, the court applied a transformative use
inquiry to the first statutory factor.58 The court reasoned that
Koon’s purposes in using Blanch’s photography were quite
different from Blanch’s goals in creating it.59 Blanch had created
her photograph for publication in an American lifestyles magazine,
while Koons used the image as part of a large-scale painting for a
German museum.60 Furthermore, Koons wanted “the viewer to
think about his/her personal experience with these objects,
products, and images and at the same time gain new insight into
how these affect our lives.”61 Koons wanted to “show some sort of
erotic sense [;] . . . to get . . . more of a sexuality to the
photographs.”62
The Blanch court did not believe that the mere fact that Koons’
51

See id. at 259 (holding that appropriation art can be transformative).
Id. at 247–48.
53
Id. at 248.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 251.
59
Id. at 252.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
52
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work was a painting and Blanch’s work was a photograph was
enough to support a finding of fair use, nor that Koons’ work was
in a museum and Blanch’s was in a magazine to be sufficient.63 In
keeping with Kelly and Bill Graham, the court needed to find “new
expression, meaning, or message” from the secondary use.64 As
such, the Blanch court pointed to Ringgold v. Black Entertainment
Television, Inc. where a copy of a painting was used as decoration
for a television program’s set.65 In particular, the court noted that
the Ringgold court found that the secondary use served the same
decorative purpose as the original and accordingly was not
transformative.66
Further, regarding the amount and substantiality of the
selection used, the Second Circuit found that the amount that
Koons took was “reasonable in relation to the purpose of the
copying.”67 Koons only took the legs, feet, and sandals from the
original photograph, and excluded the background.68 More
importantly, Koons excluded many of the creative decisions made
by Blanch.69
Recent empirical studies suggest that when a new work is
found to be transformative, the statutory factors are essentially
replaced by transformative use. While opinions do still incorporate
by reference all of the considerations in the statute,70 the inquiry

63

See id. (“Koons does not argue that his use was transformative solely
because Blanch’s work is a photograph and his a painting, or because Blanch’s
photograph is in a fashion magazine and his painting is displayed in museums.
He would have been ill advised to do otherwise.”).
64
Id. at 251 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
579 (1994)).
65
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir.
1997).
66
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252.
67
Id. at 257.
68
Id. at 258.
69
Id.
70
Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1525, 1564 (2004) (“[T]he facial emptiness of the statutory
language means that alone, it is almost entirely useless analytically, except to the
extent that it structures the collection of evidence that a court might think
relevant to its decision.”).
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has effectively been reduced to two prongs.71 In A PatternOriented Approach to Fair Use, Michael Madison demonstrates
that courts have recognized certain patterns of practice utilized by
social and professional groups, such as the idea that journalism,
education, and comparative advertising deserve fair use
recognition.72 Madison’s research reveals that courts have typically
found uses to be fair when they find that a defendant is engaged in
one of these patterns.73 Similarly, in Predicting Fair Use, Mathew
Sag establishes that findings of transformative use tend to precede
findings of fair use.74 Additionally, in Making Sense of Fair Use,
Neil Netanel shows that transformative use has replaced inquiry
into harm to an actual or potential market as the dominant
paradigm in fair use doctrine.75 Netanel demonstrates that courts
almost always find uses to be fair when they find the use of a
copyrighted work to be transformative. His conclusion shows that
the fair use inquiry has narrowed to two prongs: whether a use has
a transformative purpose, and whether amount of copyrighted
material used was appropriate to that purpose.76
To this end, modern courts typically disregard the fourth factor
if the use is transformative.77 The only market effects that are
relevant in fair use analysis are those that result from consumer
substitution. In Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., an authoritative
recent decision, the Second Circuit opined that:

71

See Netanel, supra note 9, at 768 (“If the use is for a transformative
purpose, then the question is whether the defendant has copied more than a
reasonable amount for that purpose.”).
72
Madison, supra note 70, at 1646–47.
73
See id. at 1645–46.
74
See Sag, supra note 44, at 49, 51.
75
See Netanel, supra note 9, at 742.
76
See id. at 743, 745–46.
77
See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613
(2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that copyright owners are not entitled to control the
“transformative markets” for their works); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (“[W]hen, on the contrary, the second use
is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm
may not be so readily inferred.”).
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The more the appropriator is using the copied
material for new, transformative purposes, the more
it serves copyright’s goal of enriching public
knowledge and the less likely it is that the
appropriation will serve as a substitute for the
original or its plausible derivatives[ . ]78
In other words, highly transformative uses have a lower risk for
market harm because they are not serving the original work’s
intended market.
C. Cariou: A Broadening of Transformative Use?
In Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit held that a new work
need not comment on the original in order to be transformative.79
The court found that a new purpose and a different audience were
sufficient for a finding of fair use.80 In this case, the Second Circuit
again considered whether a fair use defense could be applicable to
appropriation art.81 Patrick Cariou, a professional photographer,
brought a copyright infringement action against a well-recognized
appropriation artist, Richard Prince, for his use of Cariou’s
copyrighted photographs of Rastafarians and Jamaican
landscapes.82 Appropriation art by definition involves directly
taking an object or another existing work of art and placing it into
a new work of art.83 In this case, Prince included Cariou’s
photographs into his new works of art. Prince had previously stated
that in his work he “completely tr[ies] to change [another artist’s
work] into something that's completely different.”84
The Second Circuit found that Prince’s use of Cariou’s
photographs was, in fact, transformative in twenty-five out of his

78

Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015).
See id. at 706–07.
80
See id. at 706, 709.
81
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–07 (2d Cir. 2013).
82
Id. at 706, 709.
83
Id. at 699.
84
Id.
79
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thirty paintings and constituted a fair use.85 The court relied
heavily on Leval’s article and Campbell in its decision and gave
great weight to the fact that the paintings were transformative
when concluding that a fair use was made.86
The court went on to hold that Prince’s work could be
transformative, notably without commenting on Cariou’s
photographs and in the absence of any defense from Prince
suggesting that he intended to comment upon or criticize Cariou’s
work.87 The court held that the photographs were transformative
because Prince’s work employed new aesthetics and had an
entirely different audience than Cariou’s work.88 The court found
that Prince’s paintings had a new expression and a new
communicative result. Accordingly, the first factor weighed in
favor of Prince because his work was transformative.89
The Second Circuit then cascaded transformativeness across
the other three statutory factors.90 For the fourth statutory factor of
§ 107, the court held that the inquiry is whether the new work
completely usurps the market for the original, and that the more
transformative the new work, the less likely it is that it does so.91
This broadened treatment of transformative use across statutory
factors, as well as the court’s rejection of the requirement of
commentary, considerably extended the fair use doctrine
previously employed in other circuits.
D. Pushing Back: The Seventh Circuit Rejects Transformative Use
Following Cariou, Harvard Law Review published an article
criticizing the Second Circuit’s analysis in the case and asserting
that the definition of transformative use adopted by the Second
Circuit was the broadest to date.92 This definition, the article
85

Id. at 694.
Id.
87
Id. at 707.
88
Id. at 708–09.
89
Id. at 708.
90
Id. at 708–09.
91
Id. at 709.
92
See Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Copyright Law — Fair Use — Second Circuit
Holds that Appropriation Artwork Need Not Comment on the Original to Be
86
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argues, is in tension with the definition of derivative works in 17
U.S.C. § 106 of the Copyright Act.93 The article is primarily
critical of the Second Circuit’s holding that new work need not
comment on the original in order to be transformative.94
Additionally, it seems to suggest that there remains some
uncertainty as to whether the holding in Campbell should be
limited to the genre of parody.95
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, the Seventh Circuit issued
the first circuit-level critique of Cariou and, more broadly, of
transformative use. In its opinion, the court cited some of the same
concerns of the foregoing article.96
The issue before the Seventh Circuit in Kienitz was whether a
fair use was made where a copyrighted photograph of Paul Soglin,
mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, was turned lime green, used to
make t-shirts and tank tops along with the words, “Sorry for
Partying,” and sold by Sconnie Nation on clothing for a marginal
profit.97 The Seventh Circuit found that a fair use was made of
Kienitz’s photographs.98 More interesting than the outcome,
however, was the court’s analysis. In the opinion, Judge
Easterbrook held that transformative use was not a statutory factor
and that it is better to adhere to the four factors listed in § 107.99
Easterbrook then proceeded to emphasize that:
The Second Circuit has run with the suggestion and
concluded that “transformative use” is enough to
Transformative. — Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1228, 1229 (2014).
93
See id. at 1232 (stating that the Second Circuit’s definition of
transformative is in direct tension with the derivative work right); see also 17
U.S.C. § 106.
94
Id. at 1228.
95
See id. at 1232; cf. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“We have applied Campbell in too many non-parody cases to require citation
for the proposition that the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases
involving parody.”).
96
See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating
that transformative use is in tension with the derivative work right).
97
Id. at 757.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 758.
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bring a modified copy within the scope of § 107.
See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d
Cir. 2013). Cariou applied this to an example of
“appropriation art,” in which some of the supposed
value comes from the very fact that the work was
created by someone else.
We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach, because
asking exclusively whether something is
“transformative” not only replaces the list in § 107
but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which
protects derivative works. To say that a new use
transforms the work is precisely to say that it is
derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected
under § 106(2). Cariou and its predecessors in the
Second Circuit do not explain how every
“transformative use” can be “fair use” without
extinguishing the author’s rights under § 106(2).100
This last passage follows some of the concerns of the Harvard
Law Review article, specifically with regard to § 106 derivative
works and the holding that certain appropriation art is a fair use.101
Further, the Seventh Circuit maintained that the fourth factor,
market effect, should be the most important in a fair use
analysis.102 The opinion went on to look at fair use through an
economic lens, relying on whether the allegedly infringing work
was a complement to, or a substitute for, the original work.103
Ignoring whether Sconnie Nation’s work could be considered
transformative, the Kienitz court held that, because a shirt or tank
top is not a substitute for the original photograph, a fair use can be

100

Id.
See id. (asserting that transformative use is in direct tension with the
derivative work right); see also Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 92.
102
Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (“We think it best to stick with the statutory list,
of which the most important usually is the fourth.”).
103
See id. at 759 (“A t-shirt or tank top is no substitute for the original
photograph.”).
101
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made in such contexts.104
Kienitz is significant in that it seemingly rejects the fair use
jurisprudence developed after Campbell. While the opinion
specifically criticizes Cariou and the Second Circuit, both the
language and analysis are dismissive of transformative use as a
whole. It thus hearkens back to pre-Campbell fair use decisions by
placing most of the weight of the statutory analysis on the fourth
factor.105
II. TRANSFORMATIVE FAIR USE: AN ISSUE?
The Seventh Circuit’s approach in Kienitz is problematic for a
number of reasons. Not only does the opinion seemingly ignore the
entirety of the fair use jurisprudence of the 1990s and 2000s, but it
also diminishes the Supreme Court’s holding in Campbell.106
Instead, the opinion puts great weight on the fourth factor of § 107
analysis.107
Placing such weight on the fourth factor does great harm to the
availability of fair use.108 In the words of Leval, “[b]y definition
every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because the
secondary user has not paid royalties.”109 One of the greatest
benefits of the new fair use jurisprudence has been that it has made
the doctrine more widely available.110 A thriving fair use defense is
104

Id.
See id. at 758 (“We think it best to stick with the statutory list, of which
the most important usually is the fourth.”).
106
See id. (“The district court and the parties have debated whether the tshirts are a ‘transformative use’ of the photo—and, if so, just how
‘transformative’ the use must be. That’s not one of the statutory factors, though
the Supreme Court mentioned it in Campbell.”).
107
See id. (holding that the fourth statutory factor is usually the most
important).
108
See Leval, supra note 1, at 1124–25 (“[I]f an insubstantial loss of
revenue turned the fourth factor in favor of the copyright holder, this factor
would never weigh in favor of the secondary user. And if we then gave serious
deference to the proposition that it is ‘undoubtedly the single most important
element of fair use,’ fair use would become defunct.”).
109
Id. at 1124.
110
See Sag, supra note 44, at 79 (maintaining that focusing on the character
of the use rather than the identity of the user makes the defense available to
105
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paramount to accomplishing one of copyright law’s foremost
goals: the promotion of culture and innovation.111
The following hypothetical exemplifies some of the differences
between the circuit split and ideally will highlight some of the
problems with the Seventh Circuit’s approach to fair use in Kienitz:
A professional photographer, Jessica Smith, takes several
photographs of New Zealand landscapes and Mäori people
performing haka. The photographs are then published in a book
entitled Yes Haka.
A recognized appropriation artist, Ronald Woratx, then
incorporates the photographs into a sequence of paintings and
collages. The original photographs are blown up in size, acrylic
paint is added, the photographs are then superimposed along with
photographs of various technologies not taken by Smith onto a
piece of sheet metal. A major news network quotes Woratx in an
interview: “I wanted to explore information-age propaganda and to
get the viewer to think about their personal experience with it.”
Gallery A is putting on a show. The owner contacts Smith
about potentially incorporating some of her photographs from Yes
Haka into the show. Gallery B is showing several of Woratx’s
works in another show, including his pieces that incorporate
photographs by Smith. The owner of Gallery A learns of Woratx’s
pieces being shown at Gallery B and then attempts to contact
Smith. Smith does not respond and the gallery owner concludes
that Smith is collaborating with Woratx and is not interested in the
exhibition at Gallery A. The owner of Gallery A then decides not
to feature any of Smith’s pieces from Yes Haka in the show.
A. Transformative Fair Use: A Second Circuit Analysis Would
Likely Support a Finding of Fair Use Because Woratx’s
Secondary Use Was Transformative
Following the new and more unified jurisprudence of
transformative fair use, a court would likely find that a fair use was
commercial actors and that the doctrine is more predictable that one might
think).
111
See Leval, supra note 1, at 1107 (maintaining that the observance of fair
use is necessary to achieve the objectives of copyright law).
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made of Smith’s photographs. This school of jurisprudence has
placed the first factor—whether the use was transformative in
nature—at the center of the analysis.112 Although first established
in Campbell, two decades of case law have narrowed it to focus
primarily on whether the purpose of the use was transformative in
nature.113 Following this paradigm, courts would then look to the
amount of the original work taken and whether it was appropriate
to the purpose of the secondary use.114 Cariou took the first prong
of this inquiry a step further, holding that a new work need not
comment on the original in order to be transformative.115 This new
fair use jurisprudence created a more uniform articulable standard
by simplifying the analysis to the foregoing two prongs.116
Thus, a court would typically begin its transformative use
analysis by examining the first factor: the purpose and character of
the use.117 In Campbell, the Supreme Court found that the inquiry
for the first factor is whether and to what extent the work is
transformative.118 The circuits have interpreted this inquiry to
focus on the extent to which the purpose is transformative.119
Professor R. Anthony Reese surveyed thirty-seven circuit court
opinions, ranging from the decision in Campbell in 1994 to
112

See Sag, supra note 44, at 55 (“According to Campbell,
transformativeness not only occupies the core of the fair use doctrine but also
reduces the importance of all other factors such that ‘the more transformative the
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.’”).
113
See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work
Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2008) (“[I]n evaluating transformativeness
the courts focus more on the purpose of a defendant’s use than on any alteration
the defendant has made to the content of the plaintiff’s work.”).
114
See Netanel, supra note 9, at 745 (“Under the transformative use
paradigm, factor three—the amount of the copyrighted work that the defendant
has used—becomes a question not of whether the defendant took what is the
most valuable part of the plaintiff’s work (as it was under the market-centered
paradigm), but rather whether the defendant used more than what was
reasonable in light of the expressive purpose driving the transformative use.”).
115
See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
116
See Sag, supra note 44.
117
Leval, supra note 1, at 1105.
118
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994).
119
See Nolan, supra note 19, at 554 (stating that courts have found purpose
to be dispositive of transformativeness).
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2007.120 In thirty-one cases, transformativeness was expressly
addressed in the first-factor analysis.121 Reese’s study revealed
that:
In all of those opinions, when the court found that
the defendant had a transformative purpose for her
use, the court found that the transformativeness
inquiry weighed in favor of fair use, regardless of
whether the court viewed the defendant as having
transformed the actual content of the plaintiff’s
work in any way. Indeed, in all of the cases where
transformativeness was found based on the
defendant’s transformative purpose, the opinion’s
ultimate conclusion was that the use was, or was
likely to be, fair.122
Following the above reasoning, the court would consider
whether the purpose of Woratx’s use of Smith’s photographs was
transformative. The application of this reasoning to the Woratx
scenario would begin by looking at whether the secondary use
serves a transformative purpose. The court would likely find such
transformativeness because Woratx’s secondary use serves a
distinctly different purpose. Smith’s photographs were created for
a traditional book on the Mäori people and their culture. Woratx
sought to express an idea about the modern world by using Smith’s
photograph as part of a large-scale collage about information-age
propaganda. This difference in the purposes of these works would
likely weigh in favor of a finding that the use was transformative.
Next, the court would examine the amount of the original work
taken and consider whether it was appropriate to the purpose of the
secondary use.123 In the Woratx scenario, the photographs taken by
120

Reese, supra note 113, at 471.
Id. at 471.
122
Id. at 485.
123
See Netanel, supra note 9, at 745 (“Under the transformative use
paradigm, factor three—the amount of the copyrighted work that the defendant
has used—becomes a question not of whether the defendant took what is the
most valuable part of the plaintiff’s work (as it was under the market-centered
121
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Smith were part of a large-scale collage along with several other
photographs and a sheet metal background. Accordingly, the
amount taken is likely proportional to the amount needed to
accomplish the purpose of the secondary use.124
Based on this two-prong approach, the court would likely find
that Woratx made a fair use of the photographs and, accordingly,
Woratx would not be held liable for copyright infringement.
B. Market-Centered Fair Use: A Seventh Circuit Analysis Would
Likely Hold Woratx Liable for Copyright Infringement Because
the Works Are Substitute Goods
Applying the recent Seventh Circuit jurisprudence of fair use,
however, the court would likely find Woratx liable for infringing
Smith’s photographs. The effect of this jurisprudence has been to
place the fourth factor at the center of the analysis and to inquire
whether the use constituted substitutional or complementary
copying within the original’s market.125
The application of this analysis to the Woratx scenario would
begin by looking at whether the secondary use was substitutional
or complementary. The focal point of this analysis is whether the
copying harms the market value of the original work. In the
Woratx scenario, Woratx created a collage that was to be exhibited
in art galleries. Smith took photographs that had potential to be
displayed in an art gallery. In this scenario, in fact, when a gallery
owner heard that Woratx’s work was being displayed in a gallery
she decided to no longer pursue an exhibit with Smith’s
photographs. According to the logic in Kienitz, this fact would
weigh against a finding of fair use because Woratx’s appropriation
paradigm), but rather whether the defendant used more than what was
reasonable in light of the expressive purpose driving the transformative use.”).
124
See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
because Koons only took the legs, feet, and sandals from the original
photograph, excluding the background and excluded many of the creative
decisions made by Blanch, the copying was reasonable in relation to the
transformative use).
125
See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“We have asked whether the contested use is a complement to the protected
work (allowed) rather than a substitute for it (prohibited).”).
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of Smith’s photographs harmed the market value of her
photographs by costing her an opportunity at a museum exhibit by
virtue of being a substitute for the photographs. Woratx’s
appropriation of Smith’s photographs would thus be unlikely to
constitute a fair use under the Seventh Circuit’s approach to fair
use.
C. Assessing the Kienitz Decision: Should There Be MarketCentered Fair Use?
Prior to Campbell, one of the mistakes of fair use precedent
that Judge Leval lamented most was the inappropriate weight
given to the market effect of a copyrighted work.126 Leval
accurately pointed out that all instances of fair use inherently
involve certain market effects because, at a minimum, the author of
the original work would be missing out on royalties.127 Placing too
much weight on this factor has the effect of stifling the availability
of fair use, which in turn can have the effect of stifling secondary
creativity.128
The Seventh Circuit’s fair use analysis in Kienitz hearkens
back to a time when courts designated the fourth factor as central
to a finding of fair use.129This approach is problematic for two
reasons. First, it ignores a highly influential Supreme Court
decision. Campbell overturned prior fair use precedent by
decentering the fourth fair use factor and placing the first factor in
the center of the inquiry. The opinion in Kienitz completely
disregards this by stating that transformative use is “not one of the
statutory factors, though the Supreme Court mentioned it in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.”130 Campbell did not simply
mention transformative use, but rather installed it as the central
126

See Leval, supra note 1, at 1125 (stating that if we treat the fourth factor
as the single most important element of fair use, then fair use will become
defunct).
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1985) (“[T]he last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of
fair use.”).
130
Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758.
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inquiry in cases involving fair use.131 The Campbell test has been
central to fair use case law since it was decided.132 It has created a
more uniform standard that, in turn, has increased the availability
of fair use.133 The Seventh Circuit should not have brushed this
aside.
Second, and perhaps the most problematic aspect of Kienitz, is
the Seventh Circuit’s attempt to revive a market-driven approach
to fair use.134 This is precisely what Leval urged courts to avoid.135
While the fourth factor is important, it should not eclipse the
requirement of justification under the first factor.136 Although a
secondary use may not impair the market value of the original one,
it does not necessarily follow that the secondary use is justified.137
A party should still need to demonstrate that the purpose of the use
was transformative and that the amount taken was proportional in
relation to that purpose. Such reasoning is supported by the basic
goal of copyright law, which is to stimulate progress in the arts for
the benefit of the public. Fair use is meant to protect secondary
creativity.138 All intellectual creativity is in some sense
derivative.139 Authors and other artists do not simply start from
scratch. Instead, they build on past ideas. Fair use recognizes this
131

See Beebe, supra note 35, at 605 (“[I]n those opinions in which
transformativeness did play a role, it exerted nearly dispositive force not simply
on the outcome of factor one but on the overall outcome of the fair use test.”).
132
See Netanel, supra note 9, at 736 (“During 2006–2010, 85.5% of district
court opinions and 93.75%, or all but one, of appellate opinions considered
whether the defendant’s use was transformative.”).
133
See Sag, supra note 44 (stating that fair use outcomes are more
predictable and consistent than commonly assumed); see also Beebe, supra note
35, at 566 (stating that unpredictability in fair use may cause defendants to
settle).
134
See Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (maintaining that the fourth factor is usually
the most important and that transformativeness is not a statutory factor).
135
Leval, supra note 1, at 1125 (“[I]f we then gave serious deference to the
proposition that it is ‘undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,’
fair use would become defunct.”).
136
Id. at 1124.
137
See id. (“The fact that the secondary use does not harm the market for
the original gives no assurance that the secondary use is justified.”).
138
Id. at 1110.
139
Id. at 1109.
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process as an inherent and important aspect of innovation.140
The Campbell test better aligns with this important aspect of
innovation. An inquiry into whether the purpose of a use is
transformative, rather than simply whether the market of the
original is harmed, better ensures that the use is of the sort that fair
use is designed to protect. While market effect should be
considered in a finding of fair use, to place it as the central element
of fair use would be a misstep by the courts.
There has been some concern, illustrated by the Kienitz court,
that transformative use may potentially override 17 U.S.C. §
106(2), which protects derivative works.141 This concern, however,
is misguided. Derivative works, by definition, involve
transformation.142 The meaning of “transform” for the purposes of
§ 107, however, is distinctly different from the meaning of
“transform” for the purposes § 106. In examining the relationship
between transformative fair use and the derivative work right, a
study by R. Anthony Reese found that courts:
[I]n evaluating fair use, generally disregard whether
the defendant has created a derivative work. In
assessing transformativeness, the courts generally
emphasize the transformativeness of the defendant’s
purpose in using the underlying work, rather than
any transformation (or lack thereof) by the
defendant of the content of the underlying work.143
Reese concluded that U.S. appellate courts have so far “not applied
fair use transformativeness in ways that significantly implicate the
scope of the copyright owner’s derivative work right.”144
Congress intended for fair use to be a doctrine with the ability
140

Id.
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) .
142
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one
or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization . . . or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed
or adapted.”).
143
Reese, supra note 113, at 484–85.
144
Id. at 467.
141
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to adapt and evolve.145 The Campbell test has given the doctrine
new life and brought it out of the darkness of the market-centered
paradigm used throughout the 1980s. The Seventh Circuit’s
rejection of Campbell not only contradicts Supreme Court
precedent, but also fails to consider congressional intent.
III. A DEFENSE OF TRANSFORMATIVE USE: THE NEED FOR A
CONSISTENT STANDARD
In light of the foregoing analysis, courts should continue to
follow a transformative use approach in fair use cases. At the heart
of any discussion of fair use should be the goals of copyright law
and the objectives that fair use seeks to accomplish. Copyright law
aims to increase the progress of knowledge and creativity by
providing a special reward—the monopoly of a copyright—to
artists.146 This individual reward, however, is given to serve a
utilitarian purpose:147 to benefit the public with “the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.”148 The fair use doctrine works
synergistically with these goals based on the idea that “excessively
broad protection would stifle, rather than advance, the
objective.”149 A thriving fair use right is vital to the progress of
culture and intellectual creativity.
Since Campbell, the development of a more uniform standard
has increased the availability of fair use dramatically.150 This is
145

See H.R. REP. 94–1476, at 66 (1976) (“[There is no disposition to freeze
the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change.”).
146
Leval, supra note 1, at 1108.
147
Id.
148
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
149
Id. at 1109.
150
See Netanel, supra note 9, at 735 (“[U]nder the market-centered
paradigm, fair use is available only when reasonable copyright holders would
consent to the defendant’s use and others like it but are prevented from doing so
due to the prohibitively high costs of negotiating for such a license.”); see also
id. at 768 (stating that under the transformative use paradigm “if the use is
transformative and the defendant has not copied excessively in light of the
transformative purpose, the use will most likely be held to be a fair use even if
the copyright holder might enter or already has entered a licensing market for
similar uses, and indeed even if the copyright holder would have been willing in
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beneficial. Fair use’s present position provides the benefit of
predictability for recognized fair uses, such as parody, and of
flexibility when it comes to cases of first impression. This allows
fair use to adapt to new technologies and the times.
The adoption of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Kienitz by
other district courts would be detrimental to the fair use doctrine.
To maintain uniformity, the Seventh Circuit should uphold the
standard set out by the Supreme Court in Campbell. At present,
practitioners would have to prepare an entirely different argument
for fair use in the Seventh Circuit than anywhere else in the United
States.
Furthermore, the standard embraced by the Seventh Circuit in
Kienitz, which places the fourth factor at the heart of the analysis,
will too often cause a fair use plea to lose.151 Cases involving
value-added uses, which are nevertheless public and commercial in
nature, will always be present in the courts. If such cases were to
lose out from an approach that focused on the fourth factor, the
public would lose out on the benefit of such innovation. This
contradicts what the fair use doctrine was intended to
accomplish.152
While some discrepancies will always exist regarding a fair use
analysis,153 rejecting a standard ubiquitous amongst the rest of the
circuit courts is a different matter. The transformative fair use
jurisprudence has served to empower the doctrine, resulting in
more predictability, and is more closely aligned with the goals of
copyright law. Fair use has evolved greatly over the last two
decades and to revert to a pre-Campbell market-centered fair use
analysis would be to regress back to a less consistent, weaker fair
use defense. Accordingly, courts should disregard Kienitz’s larger
implications and continue to use a transformative fair use
principle to license the use in question”).
151
Leval, supra note 1, at 1125 (stating that if we treat the fourth factor as
the single most important element of fair use, fair use will become defunct).
152
Id. at 1110 (maintaining that fair use is meant to protect secondary
creativity as a legitimate concern of copyright).
153
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014)
(holding that a nonprofit educational use may weigh in favor of a finding of fair
use under the first factor, even when nontransformative).
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approach.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Kienitz would significantly impact the fair use
landscape for secondary users of creative works if widely adopted.
Congress intended fair use to promote secondary creativity and
recognized it as a valid policy goal of copyright protection.154 With
multiple standards and less predictability, the result could stifle
secondary creativity. Additionally, adoption of a market-centered
fair use analysis would cause the public to lose out on the benefits
of thriving fair use defense, including increased innovation and the
progress of culture. Under the foregoing approach, value-added
uses that are still public and commercial in nature would often
lose.155
There was a time, in the period following the Supreme Court
decision in Harper & Row,156 when the market-centered fair use
inquiry dominated. This period, however, was marked by
unpredictability and confusion over fair use—making it difficult to
take advantage of the defense. Because there is a high cost of
defending a claim of infringement in court and devastating liability
if one incorrectly evaluates the outcome of a case, the ability to
forecast outcomes to a certain extent is critical to a thriving fair use
policy.157
With the modern paradigm of transformative use, however,
comes a doctrine that generates relatively predictable outcomes
and is widely available. Accordingly, the circuits, including the
Seventh Circuit, should follow the thriving transformative fair use
jurisprudence that has been maintained since the Supreme Court
decision in Campbell. There is no need for Congress to intervene
154

See Leval, supra note 1, at 1110 (stating that the fair use doctrine
protects secondary creativity as a legitimate concern of copyright).
155
Leval, supra note 1, at 1125.
156
See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1985) (“[T]his last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of
fair use.”).
157
Marjorie Heins & Tricia Beckles, Will Fair Use Survive?, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE 4 (Jan. 4, 2005), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/publications/Will%20Fair%20Use%20Survive.pdf.
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in this circuit split; a strong fair use defense needs the ability to
adapt to changing technology and times. Congress did not want to
freeze fair use in 1976 by statute, but rather wanted the law to
continue to adapt and evolve with the times.158
The Supreme Court established the transformative use inquiry
in Campbell, which the Seventh Circuit has seemingly ignored. It
remains to be seen how other courts will react to Kienitz. However,
it would be best practice for courts, including the Seventh Circuit,
to follow a transformative use approach to cases involving fair use.
PRACTICE POINTERS
 The courts now focus on transformative use rather than
inquiry into market harm when determining whether a use
is fair.
 In determining whether a use is transformative, courts
inquire primarily into whether a use has a new purpose, not
whether there has been literal alteration of a copyrighted
work.
 If it serves a new purpose, a use need not comment on an
underlying work in order to be considered fair.

158

See H.R. REP. 94–1476, 66 (1976) (“The bill endorses the purpose and
general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to
freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid
technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair
use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”).
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